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The employer of this thesis is a global company called KPMG. In addition to KPMG’s primary 
accounting services, the company has also expanded its expertise to the field of information 
security. The purpose of this thesis was to construct an environment for KPMG to showcase 
identity federation solutions, using Shibboleth Identity Provider.  
The research method used in this thesis is constructive and it is based on a real life use case. 
Some of the references used in this thesis are from the environment that was built, while most 
of the facts are based on scientific articles and studies 
Objective was to use Shibboleth Identity Provider software, because it is used by many major 
organisations as a foundation of their identity federation services. This thesis covers the basic 
steps of establishing an identity federation environment, as well as discusses the different 
options and viewpoints for choosing a specific platforms or software.  
Identity federation stands for the means and standards of transferring user-related information 
from one security domain to another through an interface such as a web browser, allowing 
companies or organisations to separate user authentication to a separate service. The purpose 
of adapting an identity federation system is to achieve economic benefits, better user 
experience and enhance information security.  
In conclusion, the identity federation environment that was built is a very generic and has room 
for future improvements. However, it demonstrates and describes its primal purpose of 
transferring user identifying information across different systems.  
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IDENTITEETIN FEDEROINTI KÄYTTÄEN 
SHIBBOLETH IDENTITY PROVIDER -
OHJELMISTOA 
Opinnäytetyön toimeksiantajana on globaali yritys nimeltään KPMG. Alunperin ainoastaan 
tilintarkastuspalveluita tarjoava KPMG on sittemmin laajentanut repertuaariaan kattamaan myös 
tietoturvapalveluita. Opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli rakentaa KPMG:lle ympäristö, jolla voidaan 
esitellä identiteetin federoinnin ominaisuuksia. Identiteetin federointi voidaan ilmaista myös 
termillä luottamusverkko.  
Opinnäytetyön tutkimusmenetelmä on konstruktiivinen ja se perustuu tosielämän 
käyttötapaukseen. Osa lähteistä on suoraan peräisin rakennetusta ympäristöstä, mutta suurin 
osa tiedosta perustuu moniin eri tieteellisiin artikkeleihin ja tutkielmiin. 
Tarkoituksena on käyttää Shibboleth Identity Provider ohjelmistoa, koska monet suuret yritykset 
käyttävät sitä luottamusverkkojen pohjana. Opinnäytetyö kattaa luottamusverkon luomisen 
periaatteet, sekä esittelee erilaisia vaihtoehtoja ja näkökulmia tiettyjen ohjelmistojen tai 
alustojen valitsemisien tueksi.  
Luottamusverkolla tarkoitetaan tapoja ja standardeja, joilla siirretään käyttäjään liittyvää tietoa 
eri tietoturvaympäristöstä toiseen, mahdollistaen sen, että organisaatiot tai yritykset voivat 
erottaa käyttäjän tunnistamisen erilliseksi palveluksi. Luottamusverkoilla tavoitellaan 
taloudellisia hyötyjä, parempaa käyttäjäkokemusta, sekä parannetaan tietoturvaa.  
Lopputulemana on se, että opinnäytetyönä rakennettu ympäristö on hyvin geneerinen ja siihen 
jää kehittämisen varaa. Joka tapauksessa, se toteuttaa sen perustavanlaatuisen tarkoituksensa, 
eli onnistuu välittämään käyttäjän tunnistamiseen liityvää tietoa paikasta toiseen. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this thesis is to provide an example of how identity federation can 
be achieved using Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP) software, and discuss the 
requirements and prerequisites to complete this real-life use case. However, to 
understand the structure and the methods used, it is vital to provide a short the-
oretical section as a foundation for this thesis. More thorough explanation of the 
identity federation will be disclosed briefly below in the next chapter. 
Prior to writing this thesis, I constructed an identity federation system using the 
Shibboleth IdP software and Apache’s servers. The environment is to be a part 
of a proof of concept environment for a company called KPMG, to demonstrate 
benefits of federated access management for potential customers. KMPG is an 
international company, whose primary services were accounting services, but 
since then the company has expanded its expertise to the field of information 
security, especially to offer Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions. 
The end result contributes as a part of larger proof of concept environment, in-
cluding also other aspects of access management, which are not disclosed in 
this thesis. I was motivated to take on this assignment, as it provided a great 
way to learn more of the field of my employment. The work I did gave me a 
chance to see the fundamental level of the systems I work with daily.  
In addition to Shibboleth IdP, the environment in this thesis is built completely 
upon open source software. Apache HTTPD is used as a frontend server and 
Apache Tomcat as a backend server, together with OpenSSL to provide Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). The purpose of the 
aforementioned will be discussed in the third chapter. The thesis will walk the 
reader through the prerequisite steps of building an identity federation system 
and also present some plausible options for the platforms. 
Fourth chapter focuses in depth on the subject of Shibboleth IdP. The afore-
mentioned software is one part of Shibboleth's Identity Federation solution fami-
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ly. Shibboleth is an open-source project and each component is open source 
and can be used free of charge even commercially (Shibboleth 2015). 
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2 IDENTITY FEDERATION AND IDENTITY AND ACCESS 
MANAGEMENT 
Identity federation should be seen as a part of IAM architecture. IAM solutions 
are attempting to provide a solution for the amassing security threats that are 
posed by distributed and mobile computing, as well as overall increased usage 
of IT systems (Hudson 2011, 2). Sharing resources among heterogeneous or-
ganisations or IT systems is gratuitously complicated, as most systems deploy 
built-in identity and access control mechanisms. Therefore IAM solutions seek 
to develop technologies to separate authentication and authorization processes 
from the applications with the help of web-based technologies and standards. 
(Gaedke 2015, 1) 
In addition to fulfilling different business needs, there are also legislative rea-
sons that demand the organisations to protect digital identities. Finnish Ministry 
of Finance for example states access management registries are affected by 
the same legislation as personal data protection and care liabilities legislation 
(Finnish Ministry of Finance 1999/523). As such, databases that hold user in-
formation need to be protected, and only required information on the user may 
be collected, which makes carefully planned IAM increasingly crucial. 
As mentioned above, identity federation system is tightly dependent on IAM, 
which refers to a compilation of standards, policies and technologies used to 
securely provide a user with a digital identity. Identity must be distinguishable 
from other digital identities in the given network and it consists of characteristic 
elements. These elements are called identifiers when they are used in the iden-
tification process, and commonly the identity is represented as a unique identifi-
er, a value such as an account name or number (Josang 2015, 1). In other 
words, identifiers are used to determine the identity of a user. Digital identity is 
sometimes referred to as federated identity (OASIS 2008, 8), depending on the 
context and terminology used. The employer of this thesis has chosen the term 
digital identity over federated identity, which is why this term is used in this the-
sis. 
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Two or more organisations, or within one organization's borders, identity federa-
tion systems can be established to share IAM system. The digital identity attrib-
utes are distributed in agreed upon standards, rules and policies, to enable us-
ers to access protected resources in a secure and easy-to-use manner (EDU-
CAUSE 2015, 1). Identity federation systems must also conclude how the user 
is authenticated, for example how the validity and correctness of the user's 
unique identifier is verified (Josang 2015, 1-2).  
Different standards are used to govern the exchange of the digital identity iden-
tifiers. The standard used by Shibboleth IdP is Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) 2.0, which will be described in detail later in the thesis. In addi-
tion to SAML 2.0, OAuth, OpenID and Facebook Connect are widely used, albe-
it to satisfy different business cases and to function with different software or 
applications (Mehta 2014). 
A concrete example of an identity federation system is Haka trust network, an 
identity federation system used by Universities and Universities of Applied Sci-
ences in Nordic Countries, and University hospitals, research centres and the 
organisations that provide services for the aforementioned parties (Tuomi 
2015). This enables students and staff to use only one set of username and 
password combination to access resources from other domains more efficiently. 
This kind of feature makes it also easier for administrators to add access rights 
for users, as they do not need to be recreated or replicated to another user re-
pository.  
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3 PREREQUISITES AND PLATFORMS 
Shibboleth IdP software requires certain platforms and components in order to 
function properly. The next sub-sections describe in detail Apache HTTPD, 
Apache Tomcat and OpenSSL that are the foundation upon which Shibboleth 
IdP is compiled. The whole environment is built on CentOS operating system, 
using one frontend and one backend. The same system could be produced with 
any number of previously mentioned elements. Similar environment could be 
built using package-managing utilities, such as Yum, which would streamline 
the process by automatically compiling the servers, but to comprehend the sys-
tem as a whole, the building blocks are installed separately. 
For security reasons, the following elements should not be installed or run as a 
root user. If any of the servers are compromised and they are run as a root, it 
means the attacker can directly exploit the whole system, such as its connec-
tions to different applications or databases (Wallen 2009). It is advisable to cre-
ate new user group and user and give them recursive rights to write, read and 
execute only in required directories.  
3.1 Apache HTTPD 
The most logical way to go through the prerequisite platforms for the thesis is to 
start with the frontend Apache HTTPD server. This thesis uses release 2.4.12 of 
Apache HTTPD. This server was picked as it is open source and can be down-
loaded freely from Apache’s website. Alternative option for a frontend server 
could be IBM’s HTTP Server, which is also free of charge and is based on 
Apache’s HTTPD server (IBM 2015). However, to avoid compatibility issues, 
IBM’s HTTP Server should run with a chargeable IBM WebSphere Application 
server as a backend, which is why Apache HTTPD was chosen. As default, 
compatibility between products from different vendors cannot be guaranteed. 
Frontend and backend servers are program interfaces, or layers, which provide 
content for the user. User can interact directly with frontend servers by web 
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browser or other interface (WhatIs 2006). This thesis uses the frontend server 
to collect user information, in other words, user provided username and pass-
word combination and relay them securely to Shibboleth IdP located at the 
backend server.  The credentials can be requested an outside source, for ex-
ample an application outside of this specific system that can validate the user 
through the IdP. 
The HTTPD server is first uploaded to the server using the wget command, 
which is used to download content from websites via the command line inter-
face. After the installation, certain modifications need to be done in order to 
achieve the basic login form that collects credentials from the user and relays 
them to the IdP. 
3.1.1 Compiling Apache HTTPD 
Prior to compiling the Apache HTTPD instance, Apache Portable Runtime 
(APR) and Perl-Compatible Regular Expressions Library (PCRE) are down-
loaded on the server (Apache Software Foundation 2015). The first one is used 
to both create and maintain software libraries for Application Programming In-
terfaces (APIs), to which software developers can code without the need to 
modify or customize the code depending on the platform (Apache Portable 
Runtime Project 2015). PCRE on the other hand provides a library for Perl 5, a 
general-purpose code language, which can complete a wide range of tasks 
from system administration to network and web development (Robert 2015). 
Simply put, APIs such as APR and PCRE provide an interface between two 
systems that are possibly written in different code languages and thus making 
development processes more straightforward. After acquiring both of the afore-
mentioned, as well as downloading OpenSSL, the Apache HTTPD server can 
be compiled by running the following syntax inside bin directory: 
./configure --enable-ssl --enable-proxy-http --enable-proxy-connect --enable-
headers --enable-rewrite --prefix=/<location of the Apache HTTPD installation> -
-with-ssl=/<location of the OpenSSL download> --with-included-apr --with-pcre 
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The aforementioned compiling statement adds SSL, HTTP Proxy and Proxy 
connect, and headers to the httpd.conf file. These are used to configure the 
server appropriately, but the configurations can also be added after the server 
has been compiled. Separately downloaded APR utilities must be located in the 
HTTPD server root inside scrlib directory, thus the use of - with-included-apr 
(Apache Software Foundation. 2015). Sometimes the system might not find 
PCRE installation, so the script must be pointed to use the  -with-pcre parame-
ter (Apache Software Foundation 2015).  
3.1.2 httpd.conf 
The Apache HTTPD main configurations are done to the httpd.conf file. The 
default configuration file contains multiple commented-out configurations to im-
plement different elements to the frontend server. Prior to other setups howev-
er, the server should be bind to a port (Hock-Juan 2015). Apache uses port 80 
as a default port to transmit data between the browser and server using TCP 
protocol (Gite 2005), but in theory the listen port can be configured to listen to 
any open port. 
To be able to access the resource from the internet browser, the httpd.conf file 
needs a ServerName parameter. Either the server's hostname or IP-address is 
addressed in the configuration file (Hock-Juan 2015), in order to make the web 
content accessible from the browser. The configuration file also holds the loca-
tion of the root directory for the web documents, which is a location on the serv-
er, which holds for example HTML-files. 
One of the most fundamental parts of this thesis is the login handler, which is at 
the bottom of the configuration file. The handler is used to direct the user to an 
appropriate page after successful or unsuccessful login attempt. The login form 
on the frontend Apache server is dedicated to transfer user credentials to Shib-
boleth IdP, which processes the credentials and relays them securely to exter-
nal applications. A more elaborate description of this process is explained in the 
later chapters. 
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<Location "/idp"> 
    AuthFormProvider file 
    ErrorDocument 401 "/index.html" 
    AuthUserFile "/usr/oppari/conf/.passwords" 
    AuthType form 
    AuthName realm 
    Session On 
    SessionCookieName session path=/ 
    Require valid-user 
    ProxyPass ajp://localhost:8019/idp 
    ProxyPassReverse ajp://localhost:8019/idp 
</Location>  
 
Different functionalities and features can be added to the Apache HTTP server 
by taking advantage of its modularity with the use of LoadModules (Gite 2006). 
The login form that collects user's credentials uses the auth_form_module, 
which allows the usage of a login form without the need to manually input ex-
cess code. The loaded modules are declared at the top of the configuration file 
above and the listing consists of other modules in addition to 
auth_form_module, which are all used to either pass the traffic between Apache 
HTTP and Shibboleth IdP or to enhance the security of the frontend server. 
To prevent credentials from showing as plain text, it is vital to implement the 
mod_session_crypto module, which encrypts the messages before they are 
sent to external locations or stored in local databases (Apache Software Foun-
dation 2015). This could potentially expose the site for cross scripting attacks, 
because contents of the user session can be interpreted from HTTP headers 
and used to get information on the underlying system (Apache Software Foun-
dation 2015).  
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The users in this case are stored locally on the HTTPD server, as can be seen 
from the AuthUserFile attribute. This is not a good practice, as it is not very se-
cure or effective, but for this proof of concept version the employer recom-
mended this solution. Typically a directory, such as Microsoft’s Active Directory, 
should be used. Active Directory is a database that can handle a large number 
of searches and read tasks, but less changes and updates (Microsoft 2015). For 
the aforementioned reasons, it functions well as a user directory, as user infor-
mation has to be altered rarely.  
The whole httpd.conf file can be found in the appendices. It includes some of 
the default comments to explain the purpose of specific elements. 
3.2 Apache Tomcat 
The previous section briefly disclosed the term backend server. In comparison 
to the frontend server, a backend is not per se visible to the user. The most typ-
ical usages for backend servers are handling the server's side, applications and 
connecting to a database or a directory (Girdley 2014). To put it plainly, a 
backend server does the operative and computing tasks that frontend server 
does not handle. A backend server can communicate directly with the connect-
ed frontend, or frontends, or intermediate programs can be used to pass mes-
sages between the two interfaces. 
As deducted from the depiction above, the term backend server is rather vague, 
as it can mean anything that resides behind the frontend servers. Apache 
Tomcat is commonly referred to as an application server, as it is capable of de-
ploying Java applications. Choosing an application server usually needs to be 
decided upon the application’s requirements, such as whether the applications 
need to be fully compatible with certain Java features or if it needs Enterprise 
JavaBean capability, which is a feature that makes application development 
easier (Campbell 2007). 
Shibboleth can be deployed on Apache Tomcat, and therefore it was chosen for 
this thesis as a counterpart for Apache’s frontend server. It is also more light-
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weighted in comparison with other options, and it doesn’t require much space, 
which makes it ideal for a test environment (Campbell 2007). Other option could 
have been JBoss, which is also an open source application server, somewhat 
similar to Tomcat. 
3.2.1 Java 
Java is a programming language, typically used to create web content and ap-
plications (Beal 2015). This widespread programming language is also the 
foundation of Shibboleth IdP. 
Java is not included in the Apache Tomcat download, so it needs to be down-
loaded separately from their website. Once downloaded and installed in the 
same server as the Tomcat, the Tomcat catalina.sh file needs to point to the 
exact location of the Java installation. The aforementioned script is used to start 
the Tomcat server. 
3.2.2 AJP Connector 
Apache Jserv Protocol (AJP) Connector is a component that communicates 
with a web connector using AJP protocol, to adapt SSL processing between the 
frontend and backend servers, to ensure security when passing user-related 
credentials (Apache Tomcat 2015). Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS are 
other plausible options, but AJP protocol provides faster processing, as it re-
quires less bandwidth compared to the aforementioned protocols and is sup-
ported by the Apache installations (Well House Consultants 2008). Because of 
its easy implementation in Apache Tomcat and Apache HTTPD, AJP is used in 
this thesis to provide a means of communication between the two servers. 
Below is the configuration for the AJP Connector, a snippet from the server.xml 
file. Frontend server's AJP connector is defined in httpd.conf file, which was dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. 
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<!-- A "Connector" represents an endpoint by which requests are received and 
responses are returned. Define a non-SSL HTTP/1.1 Connector on port 8080 -> 
<!-- A "Connector" using the shared thread pool--> 
<!-- Define a SSL HTTP/1.1 Connector on port 8443 
This connector uses the JSSE configuration, when using APR, the 
connector should be using the OpenSSL style configuration 
described in the APR documentation --> 
<!-- 
<Connector port="8443" protocol="HTTP/1.1" SSLEnabled="true" 
maxThreads="150" scheme="https" secure="true" 
clientAuth="false" sslProtocol="TLS" 
keystoreFile="/usr/oppari/idpcerts/idpself.keystore" 
keystorePass="<insert keystore password here>" /> 
--> 
<!-- Define an AJP 1.3 Connector on port 8009 --> 
<Connector port="8019" protocol="AJP/1.3" redirectPort="38443" ad-
dress="localhost" scheme="https" 
proxyPort="443" tomcatAuthentication="false" /> 
 
AJP connector is connected to port 8009, an open TCP port, as a medium be-
tween the backend and frontend server communication (NTU 2015). Technically 
any open port can be chosen to be the connector. The tomcatAuthentication 
parameter is set to false, as Shibboleth IdP is used to make the authentication 
decisions instead of the Tomcat (Apache Tomcat 2015).  
3.3 OpenSSL 
OpenSSL is used to implement TLS and SSL protocols, as well as a crypto-
graphic library to provide a secure interface to collect user credentials 
(OpenSSL Project 2015). OpenSSL allows the encryption of the data flow, to 
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prevent plain text data transmissions (SSLShopper 2010) that could be easily 
caught and interpreted.  
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4 SHIBBOLETH IDENTITY PROVIDER 
Shibboleth IdP is open source software used to hold Digital Identity information 
and assert it to a Service Provider (SP). IdP handles authentication requests 
from SPs and can provide a variety of user related identifiers to allow more so-
phisticated authentication process. This for one means better user experience 
as certain user information can be passed on to the service, reducing the need 
of manual data input (Shibboleth 2015). These identifiers are referred to as at-
tributes when they are nested inside a SAML assertion (OASIS 2008, 8).  
Shibboleth is a good choice for IAM environments, because of it is open source 
and free of charge. It means that the product is easily customisable and great 
amount of support is available in Shibboleth’s forums and free articles. One of 
the biggest rivals to Shibboleth has been Microsoft’s Active Directory Federation 
Services (ADFS), which operates only on paid licensed Windows platforms 
(Gasper 2014), making it less favorable for this use case.  
4.1 How Shibboleth Works 
Shibboleth software products work as a separate platform for user identifying 
purposes. Authentication decisions are made by sending minimal identity infor-
mation necessary between Shibboleth’s two major components: IdP and SP 
(Shibboleth 2015). In this thesis, the identifying information a user possesses, 
are the user's credentials, collected by the login handler configured at the 
Apache HTTPD server. 
Even though only the most minimal amount of information is sent between the 
providers, the authentication or authorization decisions can be highly sophisti-
cated, depending on the amount of attributes available. Attributes refer to identi-
fying information upon which authentication and authorization decisions can be 
made, for example, dividing users to employee and employer attributes. If user 
has the employee attribute, he or she may be allowed to access different re-
sources than the users with the employer attribute. 
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4.1.1 Identity Provider and Service Provider 
IdP and SP collaborate so that IdP hands over information of users to SP 
(Shibboleth 2015). Identity federation, or a trust network, is established upon 
these two components, where IdP holds the digital identities of all users and SP 
keeps the resources safe. 
A typical usage could be described as follows: a user arrives at a website and 
tries to access a resource or an application, through a web browser. They are 
forced to authenticate at IdP, in other words, their user credentials can be col-
lected through a login form supported by the IdP. After the user is authenticated 
accordingly by the information IdP supplies the SP, the user can access the 
protected resource (Shibboleth 2015). 
Authentication request can be initiated either by IdP or SP. The web browser is 
the information broker used to forward requests and responses between IdP 
and SP (Okta 2015). A high-level depiction of the flow of information is dis-
played below. 
 
Picture 1. High-level demonstration of IdP and SP collaboration (Okta 2015). 
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Shibboleth's trust establishment between the IdP and SP is achieved using by 
exchanging information between the two in the form of metadata (Cantor 2015). 
The requests and responses are relayed between the trusted parties using the 
SAML 2.0 standard, which is based on another standard called Extensible 
Markup Language (XML). SAML is described in detail below, but in short, it is a 
format for exchanging information between programs or computers, even 
across networks (W3 2015). 
4.1.2 Metadata and Certificates 
To determine the parties involved in the identity federation system, the IdP and 
SP must identify itself and one another. Shibboleth uses metadata to pass on 
identifying information of the provider, to prove it is who it claims to be. When 
the configurations in the form of signed metadata are sent from the IdP to SP, 
or the other way around, the metadata is consumed. After the information has 
been exchanged, the providers are added to the list of trusted partners and the 
receiving party receives information on how to securely communicate with the 
other provider. (Klingenstein 2010) 
The certificate signing can be self-signed or signed by a certificate authority 
(CA)(Krienke 2015), which means who determines the validity of the sending or 
receiving party. As the certificate between the providers is not used on the 
browser facing connections (Krienke 2015), a self-signed certificate is sufficient. 
A certificate signed by a CA is commonly required when customers need to be 
informed that the server's information is backed up and verified by a trusted 
source, such as Verisure (Kyrnin 2007). 
Shibboleth foundation recommends the certificate to be placed inside the pro-
vider's metadata (Shibboleth 2015). An example of the metadata is disclosed in 
the appendix. If the transmission of dataflow should be encrypted, Public-key 
cryptography can be used by placing a separate certificate for signing inside the 
metadata, in addition to the certificate used to identify the provider (Krienke 
2015). 
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4.1.3 SAML 2.0 Assertion 
SAML is a XML-based standard that is developed and maintained by OASIS 
Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC) (OASIS 2008, 8). SAML has 
several use cases, as apart from describing and transferring digital identity in-
formation, it can also be used to fuel single sign-on and other web services 
(OASIS 2008, 8). Regarding this thesis, SAML is used to declare protocol syn-
tax and structure of information exchange. As collaborating IdP and SP com-
municate via SAML assertions, they can have a mutual understand how user's 
digital identities are created and communicated (OASIS 2008, 8).  
SAML assertions can carry three types of messages: authentication, attributes 
and authorization decision. Firstly it can authenticate a user and give it access 
to specific resources, which is usually done by the IdP. Secondly the assertion 
holds information on what attributes the user holds, such as a title or access 
right level. Lastly the assertion may contain authorization decision, which tells 
the SP whether the user has or has not been granted access by the IdP. (SAML 
2007)  
The previously described messages can be in the form of requests or respons-
es. SP forms the requests, when they request information on a user, and re-
sponse assertions are sent by the IdP (Oracle 2015). The response contains 
information of the user that is forwarded to the SP via the user’s browser (Pisar-
kiewicz 2014). 
The SAML assertions are bind to a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) POST 
method. This allows the IdP to interact with the user and relay messages to the 
SP using the user’s web browser. (OASIS 2008, 21-22) HTTP is an underlying 
protocol of all internet content, which determines how messages should be for-
matted and transmitted, as well as how web browsers and servers should re-
sponse to different commands (Beal 2015).  
In other words, if SAML assertions were not bind to HTTP messages, the IdP 
could not get user related information, and the information could not be sent to 
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the SP. The key element is the web browser, which serves as a medium be-
tween the components. In this kind of use case, IdP and SP have no direct con-
nection with each other. 
 
Picture 2. SAML assertion from the IdP to SP (Pisarkiewicz 2014). 
As can be seen from the picture above, the user’s web browser, or some other 
internet facing interface, sends a typical HTTP request to the IdP. This re-
sponse may contain input from the web browser, such as user’s credentials. 
The SAML assertion is placed inside the HTTP response, and is forwarded to 
the SP, which reads the SAML assertion. (Pisarkiewicz 2014) The process 
above is IdP initiated authentication. If the authentication was requested by the 
SP, the SAML request assertion would be first generated by the SP and relayed 
to the IdP. 
There are several other standards that are used to provide identity federation 
features, albeit a little differently. One option is OAuth that can be used by SPs, 
to import contact information, commonly from email providers (Mehta). For ex-
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ample LinkedIn allows users to fetch information from contacts from email pro-
vider Gmail.  
Another example is OpenID, which bears more resemblance to SAML, but in-
stead of being used by enterprises, they are more commonly deployed to con-
sumer applications or services (Mehta). OpenID is widely implemented by sev-
eral large-scale internet applications, but due to its lack of uniform in design, it 
has become harder to implement and some claim it has lost its appeal. Face-
book Connect has also partly taken over OpenID’s market sector by allowing 
third party applications to fetch user data from Facebook. (Gilbertson 2015) 
However, big internet organisations, such as Google, still use OpenID (Google 
2015).  
4.1.4 Debugging Assertions 
IdP installation should be debugged whether it can handle requests and send 
responses, and for this thesis the configurations are tested against a website 
called TestShib (www.testshib.org). TestShib requires the IdP’s metadata to be 
inputted manually to the website, in other words, the idp-metadata.xml file is 
copied from the server and enumerated to TestShib via browser. Respectively, 
TestShib’s information needs to be added to metadata-providers.xml configura-
tion file on the server. Below is an example of an authentication requests sent 
by the SP to the IdP.  
<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" 
AssertionConsumerServ-
iceURL="https://sp.testshib.org/Shibbleth.sso/SAML2/POST" 
Destination=https://lkoppari.office.trusteq.com/idp/profile/SAML2/Redirect/SSO 
ID="_3a4f4ff9b9e26f13712619ab4c83fe16" 
IssueInstant="2015-11-27T10:05:26Z" 
ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST" Ver-
sion="2.0"> 
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    <saml:Issuer 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">https://sp.testshib.org/shi
bboleth-sp</saml:Issuer> 
    <samlp:NameIDPolicy AllowCreate="1" /> 
</samlp:AuthnRequest> 
 
The request is received and handled by the IdP, which can send authentication 
and authorization statements as a response to the requesting SP (Oracle 2015). 
The response sent by the IdP built in this thesis is lengthy and thus is enclosed 
in the appendices. The response contains information from the IdP that it has 
successfully authenticated the user. 
The response contains a certificate, to prove the message originates from an 
IdP that the SP trusts. It declares a set of algorithms and standards that govern 
the information exchange. If the user inputs wrong or invalid credentials, the 
response would tell the SP that the authentication failed and the user is not al-
lowed to access SP’s resources. 
The above could also be summarised as follows: the user tries to access a re-
source, in other words the SP, through a web browser. The SP, however, does 
not know the user’s identity and therefore cannot confirm whether the user is 
allowed to access the resources. Thus the user is redirected to a login page 
provided by the IdP. Upon inputting right credentials, the user is given an identi-
ty the SP can interpret and understand. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Complex information systems cause a lot of administrative overhead and secu-
rity issues by default. However, as expressed through countless of studies on 
information security, the weakest link most typically turns out to be the user. 
Different passwords policies can be deployed to somewhat reduce the issues 
with weak passwords, but policies itself cannot prevent for example using the 
same password in multiple systems.  
Thus in terms of security, Identity Federations make it easier to manage user-
related information, such as usernames and passwords. When this information 
can be delivered to other independent systems, the need to store user creden-
tials at each access point is reduced, which make it easier for users to access 
the resources they need. In addition, users no longer need to remember many 
different passwords, but can rely on one strong and complex password, which 
enhances information security a great deal. 
Assumedly cutting the costs of holding extensive user repositories, large-scale 
businesses are undoubtedly interested in creating a more secure information 
system, to combat possible threats and complications that poorly constructed 
information system may pose. On the other hand, some businesses might be 
interested in creating more collaborative environment with its partners or cus-
tomers, to perform better as a company. 
This thesis provides a simple example of an environment, which can be used to 
achieve the aforementioned. As demonstrated above, the environment does not 
need expensive licenses or platforms, as everything from the servers to the 
Shibboleth product family is free of charge and open source. Actually, many of 
the free and open source options, such as Apache’s HTTPD and Tomcat, are 
regarded as better than their commercial counterparts (Campbell 2007). 
The environment still needs some future enhancements, such as a proper user 
directory to enumerate user credentials, instead of storing them locally at 
Apache HTTPD server. As of now the environment servers its very fundamental 
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purpose: it gathers user-inputted information and forwards them to Shibboleth 
IdP. In real life scenarios, the environment would be complex also because they 
are typically communicating with several IdPs or SPs. The Shibboleth product 
family can also be used as an addition to other IAM software, which expand the 
capabilities of user management even further.  
As witnessed in this thesis, it is very hard to build this kind of an environment 
without prior knowledge on the subject. However, there are plenty of articles on 
the internet that provided helpful while composing this thesis. Some solutions 
needed a lot more groundwork than others, but as a concluding statement, writ-
ing this thesis took a lot less time than managing to deploy a fully-functioning 
environment using the components I described above. 
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Appendix: httpd.conf file 
#Listen port: this is the IP address and port the website can be accessed via 
browser. 
Listen 192.168.101.166:80 
#Modules: modules that add to the functionality of Apache HTTPD server 
LoadModule authn_core_module modules/mod_authn_core.so 
LoadModule authz_host_module modules/mod_authz_host.so 
LoadModule authz_groupfile_module modules/mod_authz_groupfile.so 
LoadModule authz_user_module modules/mod_authz_user.so 
LoadModule authz_core_module modules/mod_authz_core.so 
LoadModule access_compat_module modules/mod_access_compat.so 
LoadModule auth_basic_module modules/mod_auth_basic.so 
LoadModule auth_form_module modules/mod_auth_form.so 
LoadModule socache_shmcb_module modules/mod_socache_shmcb.so 
LoadModule reqtimeout_module modules/mod_reqtimeout.so 
LoadModule request_module modules/mod_request.so 
LoadModule session_module modules/mod_session.so 
LoadModule session_cookie_module modules/mod_session_crypto.so 
LoadModule filter_module modules/mod_filter.so 
LoadModule mime_module modules/mod_mime.so 
LoadModule log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so 
LoadModule env_module modules/mod_env.so 
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LoadModule headers_module modules/mod_headers.so 
LoadModule setenvif_module modules/mod_setenvif.so 
LoadModule version_module modules/mod_version.so 
LoadModule proxy_module modules/mod_proxy.so 
LoadModule proxy_ajp_module modules/mod_proxy_ajp.so 
LoadModule session_module modules/mod_session.so 
LoadModule session_cookie_module modules/mod_session_cookie.so 
LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so 
LoadModule unixd_module modules/mod_unixd.so 
LoadModule status_module modules/mod_status.so 
<IfModule unixd_module> 
User laura 
Group laura 
</IfModule> 
ServerName lkoppari.office.trusteq.com 
<Directory /> 
Options FollowSymLinks 
AllowOverride none 
Order deny,allow 
Deny from all 
</Directory> 
DocumentRoot "/usr/oppari/htdocs" 
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<Directory "/usr/oppari/htdocs"> 
Options Indexes FollowSymLinks 
AllowOverride None 
Order allow,deny 
Allow from all 
</Directory> <IfModule dir_module> 
DirectoryIndex index.html 
</IfModule> 
# The following lines prevent .htaccess and .htpasswd files from being 
# viewed by Web clients. 
<Files ".ht*"> 
Require all denied 
</Files> 
ErrorLog "logs/error_log" 
LogLevel warn <IfModule log_config_module> 
LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-Agent}i\"" 
combined 
LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b" common 
</IfModule> 
# The location and format of the access logfile (Common Logfile Format). 
CustomLog "logs/access_log" common 
</IfModule> 
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<IfModule alias_module> 
# ScriptAlias: This controls which directories contain server scripts. 
ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ "/usr/oppari/cgi-bin/" 
</IfModule> 
<Directory "/usr/oppari/cgi-bin"> 
AllowOverride None 
Options None 
Require all granted 
</Directory> 
<IfModule mime_module> 
# TypesConfig points to the file containing the list of mappings from 
# filename extension to MIME-type. 
TypesConfig conf/mime.types 
# If the AddEncoding directives above are commented-out, then you 
# probably should define those extensions to indicate media types: 
AddType application/x-compress .Z 
AddType application/x-gzip .gz .tgz 
</IfModule> 
# Secure (SSL/TLS) connections 
Include conf/extra/httpd-ssl.conf 
<Location "/idp"> 
    AuthFormProvider file 
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    ErrorDocument 401 "/index.html" 
    AuthUserFile "/usr/oppari/conf/.passwords" 
    AuthType form 
    AuthName realm 
    Session On 
    SessionCookieName session path=/ 
    Require valid-user 
    ProxyPass ajp://localhost:8019/idp 
    ProxyPassReverse ajp://localhost:8019/idp 
</Location>  
<IfModule ssl_module> 
SSLRandomSeed startup builtin 
SSLRandomSeed connect builtin 
</IfModule> 
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Appendix: Metadata and Certificate 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" 
xmlns:shibmd="urn:mace:shibboleth:metadata:1.0" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" en-
tityID="https://lkoppari.office.trusteq.com/idp/shibboleth"> 
<IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0 
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:protocol urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
<Extensions> 
<shibmd:Scope regexp="false">trusteq.com</shibmd:Scope> 
</Extensions> 
<KeyDescriptor use="signing"> 
<ds:KeyInfo> 
<ds:X509Data> 
<ds:X509Certificate> 
MI-
IDVzCCAj+gAwIBAgIUA3oeeV3blNqhPQ2YaK7biik8AVMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQ
EF 
BQAwJjEkMCI-
GA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBhcmkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMB4XDTE1 
MDcyN-
DA3MDc1NFoXDTM1MDcyNDA3MDc1NFowJjEkMCIGA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBhc
mku 
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b2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMII
BCgKC 
AQEAtwG7AiCEhSD2FoLb0ZDijiKCkJvLFXW7cOMMGfzLHDoux5RpX4KPVpl
b4Ngr 
7zhehs0ccYcoh3g3q4c456HRM67MgdOtI3DPI+sCxL4lJRCPqtC3dl65VJnkY6B
j 
eCw7KQHoDtuXT9HEM5ir/uuX8+is1ZkRJH1EEBNNHW13Bmk0c6Wp37sO7T
K0qpl5 
w83kzI4AKfwW5BKrdNvPAzVdjOijDxsUj5u2fH/52QicjYC5+xe2gb0QanX9fM2U 
kFehZXnrm+oyavds97rklUkA7Lgj15k0Aqpbvs2C/29pdyKu0kfTuEywm3+h9SUv 
AUJyX2OB8KMQQxW+skv0dfcdEQIDAQABo30wezAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUi7E9w
sWY8luR 
Dz6bhP3cX8JBG3QwWgYDVR0RBFMwUYIbbGtvcHBhcmkub2ZmaWNlLnRyd
XN0ZXEu 
Y29thjJodHRwczovL2xrb3BwYXJpLm9mZmljZS50cnVzdGVxLmNvbS9pZHAvc
2hp 
YmJvbGV0aDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEAjnn1nbl2cRQBF47BjznFlNO
NSwth 
Dwz6Mx8NA0LT4knQyDVDw3BmOz/yGZaUrShQPVFsetq5xcXXahvEghHtLYY
BB9nO 
ARXrbFihlJ6Wi80oa6AnVD1YCOpeAcMEpCazMP9ebCoT0sYMues9++UkxdG
G441L 
OS0PlE8HjUXXSbpd/CtD9RQMGJcaNSECQmHep2LX8k53gzLf2unSaOvBVZl
22scK 
W5l1GCaLvwPave4ZVWYMPRyVuaHP5DFHXo20NcKKOF35X0En7GxrIitzOO
+o1wgN 
39 
31A7LzUP2sm6OXmDULA3i33cKWSmxnDtXXU03GAACo9MJkpYWrCSjOqdx
Q== 
</ds:X509Certificate> 
</ds:X509Data> 
</ds:KeyInfo> 
</KeyDescriptor> 
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Appendix: SAML Response 
<saml2p:Response  
Destination="https://sp.testshib.org/Shibboleth.sso/SAML2/POST"  
                 ID="_d7be5ef906660a2c8b465e6e60eed3d3" 
                 InResponseTo="_a1a83cbe33543bbecd285286beea3ece" 
                 IssueInstant="2015-11-30T08:00:03.077Z" 
                 Version="2.0" 
                 xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
    <saml2:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity" 
                  xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" 
                  >https://lkoppari.office.trusteq.com/idp/shibboleth2</saml2:Issuer> 
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
        <ds:SignedInfo> 
            <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-
exc-c14n#" /> 
            <ds:SignatureMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
            <ds:Reference URI="#_d7be5ef906660a2c8b465e6e60eed3d3"> 
                <ds:Transforms> 
                    <ds:Transform  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
                    <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-
c14n#" /> 
                </ds:Transforms> 
                <ds:DigestMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
                
<ds:DigestValue>MWJXP5R5/VjS9N6fai/pCqSsLBw=</ds:DigestValue> 
            </ds:Reference> 
        </ds:SignedInfo> 
        <ds:SignatureValue> 
IVGCfmMAmKBPQJXe4Ir7PCBtc9yZeX7t4xbLs17PTbTz++AGvO4zOjgQaPT4
6sKaouXDytXA2XMsaqQm+BdcY4KmCEc4CMa1gPFXB6SDqoL5tFk1XNNWjh
VCM6OTLBedW/VJieP2eUAlk1kzNOx1pr1RbP7cN7LTzAC5cVCSegKIrGkNmx
zmDLDKX8BMSZ6qXfTphkfDNQhRgLRtkAjRl8Y/G26sgrOgaH7L6afIlUfvm/I4H
HffKAvZTwS-
RHjD2RU20tvER0+6quggYoLsUT7jFfAcJY2ga+K3z64ryMZxzqyg5XyqMBDLK/
2Z2u7CQcOM4Py5Nzq+9TxQvFV6g==</ds:SignatureValue> 
        <ds:KeyInfo> 
            <ds:X509Data> 
                
<ds:X509Certificate>MIIDVzCCAj+gAwIBAgIUA3oeeV3blNqhPQ2YaK7biik8AV
MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwJjEkMCI-
GA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBhcmkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMB4XDTE1MDcy
NDA3MDc1NFoXDTM1MDcyNDA3MDc1NFowJjEkMCIGA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBh
cmkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8
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AMIIB-
CgKCAQEAtwG7AiCEhSD2FoLb0ZDijiKCkJvLFXW7cOMMGfzLHDoux5RpX4
KPVplb4Ngr7zhehs0ccYcoh3g3q4c456HRM67MgdOtI3DPI+sCxL4lJRCPqtC3d
l65VJnkY6BjeCw7KQHoDtuXT9HEM5ir/uuX8+is1ZkRJH1EEBNNHW13Bmk0c
6Wp37sO7TK0qpl5w83kzI4AKfwW5BKrdNvPAzVdjOijDxsUj5u2fH/52QicjYC5+
xe2gb0QanX9fM2UkFehZXnrm+oyavds97rklUkA7Lgj15k0Aqpbvs2C/29pdyKu0
kfTuEywm3+h9SUvAUJyX2OB8KMQQxW+skv0dfcdEQIDAQABo30wezAdBgN
VHQ4EFgQUi7E9wsWY8luRDz6bhP3cX8JBG3QwWgYDVR0RBFMwUYIbbGt
vcHBhcmkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29thjJodHRwczovL2xrb3BwYXJpLm9
mZmljZS50cnVzdGVxLmNvbS9pZHAvc2hpYmJvbGV0aDANBgkqhkiG9w0BA
QUFAAOCAQEAjnn1nbl2cRQBF47BjznFlNONSwthDwz6 
Mx8NA0LT4knQyDVDw3BmOz/yGZaUrShQPVFsetq5xcXXahvEghHLYYBB9n
OARXrbFihlJ6Wi80oa6AnVD1YCOpeAcMEpCazMP9ebCoT0sYMues9++Ukxd
GG441LOS0PlE8HjUXXSbpd/CtD9RQMGJcaNSECQmHep2LX8k53gzLf2unSa
OvBVZl22scKW5l1GCaLvwPave4ZVWYMPRyVuaHP5DFHXo20NcKKOF35X0
En7GxrIitzOO+o1wgN31A7LzUP2sm6OXmDULA3i33cKWSmxnDtXXU03GAA
Co9MJkpYWrCSjOqdxQ==</ds:X509Certificate> 
            </ds:X509Data> 
        </ds:KeyInfo> 
    </ds:Signature> 
    <saml2p:Status> 
        <saml2p:StatusCode  
Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success" /> 
    </saml2p:Status> 
    <saml2:Assertion ID="_906c4fa0acc5c923efc6e7a88ad69ea9" 
                     IssueInstant="2015-11-30T08:00:03.077Z" 
                     Version="2.0" 
                     xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> 
        <saml2:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-
format:entity">https://lkoppari.office.trusteq.com/idp/shibboleth2</saml2:Issuer> 
        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
            <ds:SignedInfo> 
                <ds:CanonicalizationMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
                <ds:SignatureMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
                <ds:Reference URI="#_906c4fa0acc5c923efc6e7a88ad69ea9"> 
                    <ds:Transforms> 
                        <ds:Transform  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
                        <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-
c14n#" /> 
                    </ds:Transforms> 
                    <ds:DigestMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
                    
<ds:DigestValue>bWLO0e/rChnqGT5WyLvGHf5cbO4=</ds:DigestValue> 
                </ds:Reference> 
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            </ds:SignedInfo> 
            
<ds:SignatureValue>iQApg7nBVO+/GhdN3kHK/QdJG4ZQ5hNYDTEZbWM354
JK7JvWYZizXrpmbgF3I+x3YGgeW8yTMDEnnWj7662vvlbKYA6LlPE6TmSkJC
9cyqf1f5ZO7ScjIwfpYSUJHRdkAQF6h4Yu+q0nlo4KZrEC07c3BwVgq69QT5D8
kaGW82zXAffoZ70WCem6SRFY6/hld9PJmonwfP9S8cqV3K1b4D7gSAdrI256i
sIKD1C4JQdSyTUwWgzOLjCuZ8AiXBG/Xmx7HN2SfQgvvVuIWLTgyslI901Wx
NJnyM/TkMoU7imX3dfsh5hGqoVFZ9TI2rHVDAzczcINT3xkoofOfaVsPw==</ds:
SignatureValue> 
            <ds:KeyInfo> 
                <ds:X509Data> 
                    
<ds:X509Certificate>MIIDVzCCAj+gAwIBAgIUA3oeeV3blNqhPQ2YaK7biik8AV
MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwJjEkMCI-
GA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBhcmkub2ZmaWlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMB4XDTE1MDcyN
DA3MDc1NFoXDTM1MDcyNDA3MDc1NFowJjEkMCIGA1UEAwwbbGtvcHBhc
mkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29tMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8A
MIIB-
CgKCAQEAtwG7AiCEhSD2FoLb0ZDijiKCkJvLFXW7cOMMGfzLHDoux5RpX4
KPVplb4Ngr7zhehs0ccYcoh3g3q4c456HRM67MgdOtI3DPI+sCxL4lJRCPqtC3d
l65VJnkY6BjeCw7KQHoDtuXT9HEM5ir/uuX8+is1ZkRJH1EEBNNHW13Bmk0c
6Wp37sO7TK0qpl5w83kzI4AKfwW5BKrdNvPAzVdjOijDxsUj5u2fH/52QicjYC5+
xe2gb0QanX9fM2UkFehZXnrm+oyavds97rklUkA7Lgj15k0Aqpbvs2C/29pdyKu0
kfTuEywm3+h9SUvAUJyX2OB8KMQQxW+skv0dfcdEQIDAQABo30wezAdBgN
VHQ4EFgQUi7E9wsWY8luRDz6bhP3cX8JBG3QwWgYDVR0RBFMwUYIbbGt
vcHBhcmkub2ZmaWNlLnRydXN0ZXEuY29thjJodHRwczovL2xrb3BwYXJpLm9
mZmljZS50cnVzdGVxLmNvbS9pZHAvc2hpYmJvbGV0aDANBgkqhkiG9w0BA
QUFAAOCAQEAjnn1nbl2cRQBF47BjznFlNONSwthDwz6Mx8NA0LT4knQyDV
Dw3BmOz/yGZaUrShQPVFsetq5xcXXahvEghHtLYYBB9nOARXrbFihlJ6Wi80o
a6AnVD1YCOpeAcMEpCazMP9ebCoT0sYMues9++UkxdGG441LOS0PlE8HjU
XXSbpd/CtD9RQMGJcaNSECQmHep2LX8k53gzLf2unSaOvBVZl22scKW5l1G
CaLvw-
Pave4ZVWYMPRyVuaHP5DFHXo20NcKKOF35X0En7GxrIitzOO+o1wgN31A7
LzUP2sm6OXmDULA3i33cKWSmxnDtXXU03GAACo9MJkpYWrCSjOqdxQ==<
/ds:X509Certificate> 
                </ds:X509Data> 
            </ds:KeyInfo> 
        </ds:Signature> 
        <saml2:Subject> 
            <saml2:NameID  
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient" 
                          NameQualifi-
er="https://lkoppari.office.trusteq.com/idp/shibboleth2" 
                          SPNameQualifier="https://sp.testshib.org/shibboleth-sp" 
                          >_ff9b01b198ea1ef04100bf6d0ed04d24</saml2:NameID> 
            <saml2:SubjectConfirmation  
Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> 
                <saml2:SubjectConfirmationData Address="***.***.***.***" 
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                              InResponseTo="_a1a83cbe33543bbecd285286beea3ece" 
                                               NotOnOrAfter="2015-11-30T08:05:03.077Z" 
                                               Recipi-
ent="https://sp.testshib.org/Shibboleth.sso/SAML2/POST"/> 
            </saml2:SubjectConfirmation> 
        </saml2:Subject> 
        <saml2:Conditions NotBefore="2015-11-30T08:00:03.077Z" 
                          NotOnOrAfter="2015-11-30T08:05:03.077Z"  > 
            <saml2:AudienceRestriction> 
                <saml2:Audience>https://sp.testshib.org/shibboleth-
sp</saml2:Audience> 
            </saml2:AudienceRestriction> 
        </saml2:Conditions> 
        <saml2:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2015-11-30T08:00:03.026Z" 
                              SessionIndex="_9cd9d84d4b1956982a1f6bae5c1eef2a"> 
            <saml2:SubjectLocality Address="***.***.***.***" /> 
            <saml2:AuthnContext> 
                
<saml2:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Pass
wordProtectedTransport</saml2:AuthnContextClassRef> 
            </saml2:AuthnContext> 
        </saml2:AuthnStatement> 
    </saml2:Assertion> 
</saml2p:Response> 
 
